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In this paper the implicit early unwind option of a risk neutral arbitrageur is
valued. The problem is analyzed in a market microstructure framework where
four different groups of market participants interact. Within this model the
equilibrium price relationship between stock and futures markets is determined.
Since the underlying of the option is influenced by arbitrage trading~ the
underlying of the option depends~ contrary to standard option pricing theory~ on
the unwind option itself. The non-Markovian stochastic process of the basis is
characterized~ and the results of an extensive comparative static analysis of the
option value are presented.
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Kavalakis.1. Introduction
The model of cash and carry arbitrage is the most popular approach for pricing
futures on storable goods. Of all of the underlying assumptions for this approach,
the two fundamental assumptions are that arbitrageurs alone determine the
difference between spot and futures prices, and that arbitrage positions are held
until maturity.
There are good reasons to question these assumptions. First, arbitrageurs can
determine the spread between futures and spot prices, the basis, only if arbitrage
is risk free, arbitrage capital is unlimited, and capital markets are frictionless. If
any ofthese assumptions does not hold, other traders will also influence the basis.
Second, as futures are standardized contracts which are traded at organized
exchanges, open futures positions can be closed at any time before maturity, and
that means that there is no obligation for arbitrageurs to hold arbitrage positions
until maturity. The arbitrageur has the option to unwind arbitrage positions before
maturity whenever it is favourable to him or her, and this is a strategy frequently
used. Sofianos (1993) provides evidence that about 70 % of all arbitrage
positions are unwound before maturity. Merrick (1989) estimates that early
unwinding profits represent up to 44 % oftotal arbitrage profits.
With these results in mind, our paper will relax the standard assumptions in the
following way: different groups ofinvestors, including arbitrageurs, determine the
basis, and arbitrage positions may be closed before maturity.
Using these modified assumptions, we can value the early unwind option of an
arbitrageur in the framework of a market microstructure model. Contrary to
standard option pricing theory, the underlying of this option, the basis, is an
endogenous variable which depends on the trading behavior of all groups of
investors. Therefore, the basis depends on the early unwind option of the
arbitrageur itself.
There are a few approaches in the literature to value the early unwind option.
Brennan and Schwartz (1988, 1990) analyze the value of the option with an
exogenous basis assuming that the basis follows a Brownian bridge process.
Within this model, Duffie (1990) derives analytically the optimal stopping time of
the early unwind option. Tuckman and Vila (1992) using a similar setup study the
optimal arbitrage strategy without analyzing the value ofthe early unwind option.
The most important criticism against these approaches, already pointed out by
Brennan and Schwartz (1990), is that the basis should be determined
endogenously as the typical role of arbitrageurs is to influence the basis. This is
done in two papers by Holden (1990) and Cooper and Mello (1990). Holden
focuses, like Tuckman and Vila (1992), on the optimal arbitrage strategy. Hederives the optimal trading rule of an arbitrageur and the impact of arbitrage
trading on the endogenous basis. As Holden (1990) considers neither asymmetric
transaction costs nor capital restrictions, he cannot study the value of an early
unwind option. Using a model similar to Holden (1990), Cooper and Mello
(1990) allow for asymmetric transaction costs and determine the value of the
early unwind option. But, there are two assumptions in their model of the market
which are difficult to justify. First, there is a chronological segmentation in the
execution oforders so that arbitrage trading is risk free. Second, the basis follows
a mean reverting process to its cash and carry value even if arbitrageurs do not
trade. Thus, arbitrageurs have no specific role in the market. Both assumptions
are avoided in ourmodel.
Our model extends the literature on the valuation of the unwind option by
bringing together a market microstructure equilibrium model of the price
relationship between futures and spot markets with an option pricing approach.
The option valuation is done by comparing the expected profits of an optimal
arbitrage strategy with and without early unwinding in a dynamic equilibrium
setting. The spot price is endogenously determined by the trading offour different
groups of investors, the futures price process is taken as exogenous. So, the
endogenous part of the basis is the spot price which is determined by the
interaction of four groups of investors with different motives for trading. We
model the demand functions of a monopolistic risk neutral arbitrageur, two
groups ofrisk averse speculators differing in the price forecasting model they use,
and noise traders. Contrary to the arbitrageur, speculators are not assumed to
form rational expectations: one group uses historical spot price series, the other
group uses the current price in the futures market as a predictor of future spot
price changes. Consequently, the exogenous futures price has an impact on the
spot price not only through arbitrage trading, but also through its informational
role for the speculative demand. This modelling of speculative demand is similar
to De Long et al. (1990), Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990) and De Grauwe
and Dewachter (1993). It accounts for the empirical finding of several authors
that expectations infmandal markets are not formed in a uniform way.l
The basic structure ofthe model is similar to Fremault,(l991) where the impact of
stock index arbitrage on prices, volatilities and welfare is analyzed in a static
rational expectation equilibrium. In her model three groups of rational investors
with different motives for trading and unequal access to markets interact.
·However, as Fremault (1991) models a one period problem, she cannot address
the questions raised in this paper as she uses a static market setting. In order to
analyze the process of opening and closing arbitrage positions over time, a
dynamic model for the optimal arbitrage strategy has to be developed.
Frankel/Froot (1986, 1988) and Allen/faylor (1989, 1992) provide empirical evidence
'. about the weight.9f.chartists and fundamentalists in foreign exchange markets.
2The dynamic structure ofour model is similar to the model of Kyle (1985). As in
Kyle (1985), one monopolistic investor, the arbitrageur in our case, is fully
rational and determines his optimal solution to a dynamic optimization problem
given the behavior ofall other traders. A specific feature ofour model is an order
execution lag which all traders have to consider when placing their orders. As a
result, investors do not know the prices at which their orders will be executed,
and arbitrage is, in fact, not risk free. In addition, the arbitrageur has to pay
transaction costs for each opening and closing transaction.2 As unwinding a
position is assumed to result in lower transaction costs, the current arbitrage
position has an impact on these costs and, therefore, on the trading strategy ofthe
arbitrageur. Like Kyle (1985), we model the trading process as a sequence of
auctions in a pure exchange economy. But, contrary to him, trading is basically
not caused by asymmetric information of the investors, but by different motives
for trading and different price expectations.
Finally, our model is related to microstructure models analyzing several markets,
for example Bhushan (1991), Chowdrhy/Nanda (1991), Subrahmanyam (1991).
There is an essential difference concerning the interaction ofthe markets between
our model and these approaches. In their models the markets are connected by
traders who choose the best market to place their orders which results in a
shifting demand between competing markets. Contrary to that, in our model
speculators watch both markets, but are restricted to trade only in the spot
market, whereas arbitrageurs trade in both markets simultaneously or do not trade
at all.
Within the equilibrium model outlined above, the expected profits of an optimal
arbitrage strategy with and without early unwinding are determined. The value of
the unwind option is defmed as the present value of the difference between the
expected profits of these strategies. It depends mainly on the futures price, the
spot price and the net long orshort position the arbitrageur holds. Inaddition, it is
shown by numerical comparative statics how the option value depends on time to
maturity, volatility of the exogenous variable, market liquidity, and transaction
costs.
The main results concerning the value ofthe option are summarized below. Other
things being equal, the option value increases with time to maturity, transaction
costs, and market liquidity. Contrary to standard option pricing models, the
impact ofchanges in the volatility of the exogenous variable on the option value
differs for in- and out-of-the-money-options. Furthermore, the option value
increases with the number ofopen arbitrage positions held by the arbitrageur, but
at a decreasing rate. The justification for this result is that closing out one unit of
Holding costs which are analyzed by TuckmanNila (1992) are not considered in the
model. However, the model could easily be extended with respect to different types of
costs the arbitrageur faces.
3the position affects the endogemms basis adversely and therefore reduces the
value ofthe option.
The effect of the current basis on the option value is complex. In general, the
numerical results show that the value of the unwind option is mainly determined
by the size of the cash and carry basis relative to the number of open arbitrage
positions, but the impact of the cash and carry basis on the option value is
typically not monotonic. Also, evenifthe basis and the net number of arbitrage
positions are fixed, the value ofthe option depends on the current spot price.
The model presented here improves the understanding of the arbitrageur's
behavior between spot und futures markets by considering the impact of the
unwind option and may explain the path dependency of the basis found by
MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988). Since the current behavior ofthe arbitrageur
is influencedby his trades in the past, which were mainly determined by the basis
at that time, future changes in the basis depend on the path of the basis in the
past. Also, the results may be seen in another context. Unwinding is a strategy
usable in futures markets where standardized contracts are traded. In contrast,
forwards are individual agreements between partners so that unwinding iS'much
harder to realize. Thus, the unwind option may be a reason for price differences
betweenfutures and forwards evenwhen interest rates are not stochastic.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the
microstructure model is developed, and the equilibrium price process is
determined. In section 3 the unwind option is defmed, and the determinants ofits
value are discussed. Section 4 contains the main body of results. In the final




Three markets are considered in the model: the futures· market, the spot market,
and the money market. The futures market is exogenous, and only one futures
contract is traded at a time. The price of that contract is assumed to follow a
random walk process. There are no transaction costs, and the market is free of
It is wellknown that in an economy with non-stochastic interest rates and zero
transaction costs, the prices of futures and forwards are equal in absence of arbitrage
opportunities. See for example Cox/IngersolllRoss (1981).
4restrictions. It is assumed that futures are settled at the equilibrium spot price on
the maturity date, and that there is neither a marking to market nor an initial
margin payment.4
In the money market, the investors can borrow or lend a riskless asset without
restrictions. The return ofthe asset is assumed to be constant and exogenous.
In the spot market, the arbitrageur, noise traders, and speculators trade a single
asset. The class of speculators is divided into two groups which differ in the
infonnation they use to forecast future spot price changes. One group of
speculators consists of positive feedback traders, and the other of information
traders.
Positive feedback traders are risk averse investors who buy assets when prices
rise and sell them when prices fall. This kind of behavior may result from
extrapolative expectations about future spot price changes in the following sense:
an asset which has strongly performed in the past is expected to outperform in the
future. Using this forecast model, positive feedback traders choose a portfolio
consisting of the spot market instrument and the risk free asset which maximizes
wealth in a mean-variance framework. They do not take positions in the futures
market. Transaction costs are assumed to have neither an impacton the demand
ofthis group oftraders nor on the demand ofinfonnation traders.
Information traders are also assumed to be risk averse, to choose a mean
variance efficient portfolio, and not to take positions in the futures market. They
differ from positive feedback traders by the forecasting model for future spot
price changes which they use.S With respect to the relationship offutures and spot
prices, their expectations are almost rational as they assume that the spot price
exhibits a mean reversion behavior to the spot price implied by the futures price
through cash and carry arbitrage. That suggests that infonnation traders expect an
almost parallel movement of spot and futures prices and use the current futures
price as an infonnation source for their trades in the spot market. 1bis behavior
can be rationalized by the empirical finding of several papers that the futures
market leads the spot m~et.6 Therefore, if the current basis is above the cash
and carry basis, the infonnation traders expect that the basis will decrease and the
spot price will increase in the future. In this case infonnation traders exhibit a
smaller demand in the spot market as in the case ofa current basis which is below
This assumption is taken for convenience and could easily be omitted since the riskless
rate ofreturn is assumed to be constant.
Infonnation traders should not be confused with infonned traders which usually denote
investors who have better infonnation than other investors. For a model with infonned
traders see for example Kyle (1985).
For example, see Stoll/Whaley (1990), Chan (1992), and Grunbichler/Long-
staff/Schwartz (1992).
5the cash and carry basis. lhis information effect which is "the big benefit from
futures markets", as Black (1976) has pointed out, provides a first link between
futures and spot market.
A single monopolistic arbitrageur trades in the spot market and in the futures
market. He observes the current basis and builds rational expectations about the
price changes in the spot and futures market. His trades in both markets are based
on these expectations. The arbitrageur is assumed to be risk neutral. His objective
is to maximize total expected arbitrage profit over a fixed finite time interval
[0,T]. The arbitrageur has to pay proportional transaction costs in the spot
market, but there are no transaction costs in the futures market. Ifhe builds up a
new arbitrage position he is obliged to pay round trip transaction costs. If he
unwinds an arbitrage position he has to pay unwind transaction costs which are
assumed to be lower than round trip costs'? lhis asymmetry between transaction
costs for opening and closing positions has two major consequences. First,
transaction cost asymmetry makes the early unwind option valuable because
closing a long (short) position and opening a new short (long) position of the
same size would yield different profits. Second, the decision of the arbitrageur
depends on his current position, or, equivalently, on his trades in the past. The
arbitrageur considers the impact of his demand on the basis. Therefore, despite
his risk neutrality, he does not exhibit an unlimited arbitrage demand as soon as
the expected profitbecomes positive.
Finally, there are noise traders in the spot market. Noise traders are introduced n
order to model the basis risk. Without noise traders, the futures and spot markets
would be locally perfectly correlated. Theirdemand is described by an exogenous
stochastic variable.
The model is a short period model in that it only analyzes the period oftime [O,T]
over which one futures contract with expiration date T+I!J is traded. The period
[O,T] is divided into N intervals of the length ~t. The individual trading dates are
denoted by tn, 1 ~ n ~ N. The fIrSt trade takes place at time t, = I!J, and the last
occurs at tN =T. At time T+I!J there is no trading in the futures market, the
futures contract is settled at the spot price, and no arbitmge profits or losses can
be realized. Therefore, there is no optimization problem to be solved by the
arbitrageur at that time. Consequently, that date will have no impact on the value
ofthe early unwind option and will notbeconsidered inthe model explicitly.
The trading sequence is as follows. An investor places his order at time tn-I.
After a positive execution lag, ~t, a Walrasian auction takes place at tn. After this
auction at time tn, investors may give further orders to be executed at time tn+1.
So, there is a sequence ofN auction equilibria.
For a justification ofthis assumption see Brennan/Schwartz (1990).
6Two types of orders are considered in the model. An investor may specify his
demand depending on the realization of the unknown future spot price (limit
orders) or the investor may demand a certain quantity (market order). The groups
ofspeculators are assumed to place limit orders, so that the quantity they will buy
or sell is unknown, but optimal, given the realization of the price in the next
period. In contrast, the arbitrageur submits market orders in order to get a known
quantity. Otherwise he would run the risk of open positions in the spot or futures
market. Like arbitrageurs, noise traders are assumed to place market orders.
2.2 Demand Specification
In the following section the demand functions of the different groups ofinvestors
for strictly positive spot prices are derived. 8
(I) Demand function ofpositive feedback traders
Positive feedback traders use historical spot prices to forecast future spot prices S:(tA).9 A simple forecasting model ofthat type is given by 10
where n = 1,...,N. Here, JlF denotes a fIxed growth rate of the spot price per year
which is assumed to be constant and positive. ~F is a constant and positive factor
of adaption. Hence, ifthe spot price has increased at a rate larger than JlF in the
period from the fIxed point oftime to in the past to the current date t
A
, the second
term is positive, and positive feedback traders adjust their expectations. An asset
with a performance better than JlF is expected to outperform in the future, too.
The term, aFZF(tA)' is a normally distributed random variable with an expected
value ofzero and variance o~&. ZF(tj ) and ZF(tk) are assumed to be uncorrelated
whenever tj *tk (i,k = 1,...,N).
10
Additional provisions have to be considered when the spot price approaches to zero in
order to assure that only positive equilibrium prices are obtained. This matter is not
further pursued here. - S:(fA) denotes the spot price forecasted by positive feedback traders using the forecast
model (1).
Tildes indicate stochastic variables. Note that the forcasting model is defined conditional
on the spot price S(tA-l).
7The demand DF[t",SU,,)] of an individual positive feedback trader for the spot
instrument at time t" is defined as the change of the optimal risky investment
between time t"_1 and time t". To detennine this demand function the optimal
portfolio ofa feedback trader at time t" has to be characterized.
As positive feedback traders place limit orders, their orders submited at time t"_1
will depend on the unknown spot price SU,,). Conditional on the realization S(tn>
of SU,,) they will invest the proportion wF[t",S(t,,)] of their wealth WF[t",SU,,)] in
the risky asset and l-wF[t",SUn>] in the risk free asset with the constant rate of
return r.
By assumption, positive feedback traders maximize their end of period wealth,
wi (t,,+I)' in a state independent mean-variance framework.ll In addition, they
behave myopically. Using the constant factor, YF' of the absolute risk aversion,
their optimization problem conditional on the spot price s(t,,) can be specified as




and S(t,,) >O,n=1,...,N. From the optimal solution, w;[t",S(t,,)], the optimal
number, x;[t",S(t,,)], ofthe risky asset inhis portfolio follows as
(3)
where SF(t,,) == S(to)el!p(t.-to) denotes the reference 'spot price in the forecasting
model of the feedback trader. From the definition of the demand function,
DF[t",S(t,,)], it follows: 12
11 wi (t,,) denotes the wealth forecasted by positive feedback traders using the forecast
model (1).
12 As the demand function only depends on the price change, 65(t,,) == S(t,,)-S(t,,_I), for
convenience, the price change is used as argument ofthe demand function.
8(4)
DF[tn,dS(tJ]=X;[tn,S(tJ] - x; [tn_l'S(tn_ 1)]
=_1_ 2 {[~F -r+PF]dS(tJ-PFdSF(tJ}.
YFCJF
This demand function is linear in the spot price change. Since positive feedback
traders are defmed as investors who buy when the price rises, the slope of their
demand function, a F ,
(5) a =[~F-r+PF]
F- Y FCJ~
is assumed to be positive. The second part of the demand function in equation (4)
shows that positive feedback traders will sell the risky assets when there is no
change ll.!. the spot price as the reference price SF(tn-l) increases over time.
Defming the parameter, AF == PF/Y FCJ~, the demand function can be rewritten as
(n=t,...,N).
(II) Demand function ofinformation traders
In contrast to positive feedback traders, infonnation traders use the futures price
to forecast spot price changes. The spot price implied by the current futures price
through cash and carry arbitrage is subsequently denoted as implied spot price,
S/(tn_I). Itis the discounted current futures price and is defmed as 13
The cash and carry, or, implied basis is defmed as the difference
F(tn_I'T+dt)-S,(tn_I)' This implied basis differs from the (endogenous) basis
which is defmed as F(tn_I'T+M)-S(tn_I)' Finally, the difference between the
endogenous basis and the cash and carry basis can be considered as the
mispricing
(8) MIS(tn) == S/ (tn) - S(tn)
of the spot instrument. Infonnation traders expect the spot price to rise when the
futures price or, equivalently, the implied spot price rises. In addition, if the
current endogenous spot price differs from the implied price, infonnation traders
13 It is assumed that the spot instrument does not pay any income. This assumption is
fu1fi11ed for the German Stock Index DAX as it is a performance index reinvesting all
dividends. Note that the implied spot price will in general not be equal to the equilibrium
price ofthe model.
9expect the spot price to adjust to this value. The following simple forecasting
model for the future spot price, S;CtJ, has the desired properties:
'~/denotes a constant and positive factor of adaption, and cr/i/Ctn) is a random
disturbance with identical properties as crFiFCtJ. From (9) follows that the
mispricing expected by an information trader exhibits a mean reversion behavior
around zero.
The implied spot price, which is perfectly linked with the exogenous futures
price, is assumed to follow a stochastic process denoted byl4
where criCt,,) is a normally distributed random variable with an expected value of
zero and variance cr
2At. The random variables iCU and iCtt ) are assumed to be
uncorrelated whenever ti '* tt (i,k =1,...,N).
Information traders behave like positive feedback traders, but they use the
forecast model in equation (9) and the exogenous implied spot price as defined in
equation (10) for determining their optimal demand. Using the same arguments as
in part (1), their optimization problem is specified as
max .{E[WiCtn+I)]-.!.Y' var[wiCtn)]}, w/[t.,s(t.l] 2
(11) where




) +{1-w,[tn,SCtn)]}l-v, [t",S(tJ](1 +rAt)
Sct,,)
and S(t,.) >O,n=1,...•N. Standard calculations yield the optimal demand of an
individual infonnation trader. It depends on the spot price and the futures price at
time tn. Therefore, the limit order ofeach information trader is a function of SCt,,)
and FCt",T+At) or, equivalently, of SCt,,) and S,(t,,). As the demand function is
linear in the spot price differences, SCt,,)-SCt,,_I)' and in the differences of the
implied spot price, S/Ct,,)-S,Ct"_I)' again, for convenience, in the demand function
14 This fonnulation with a constant volatility of the implied price change AS/ (t,,) is chosen
for convenience. Ofcourse, the model could also be fonnulated with a constant volatility
of AFCt".T+At),and a volatility of AS/ct,,) decreasing with time to maturity.
10the arguments AS(tn)=S(tJ-S(tn_l) and DS/(tn)=S/(tn)-S/(tn_l) are used.ls Then,




(13) =.l (r+~/) 0
0./ - 2 2 >
y/ CJ/+CJ
turns out to be positive, and, therefore, the slope, -0./, of the demand function is
negative. The demand of infonnation traders depends on price changes of the
exogenous variable. This is the frrst reason why changes ofthe futures price have
an impact on the equilibrium spot price.
(III) Demand ofthe monopolistic arbitrageur
The monpolistic arbitrageur is assumed to maximize the present value of his
expected total arbitrage profit in the period of time [O,T]. His trading strategy is
defined as a sequence of N market orders, DAUn)' which are placed at point of
time tn- 1 (n=I....,N). The result ofa long orshort arbitrage position is obtained at
point oftime T+At. It depends on the futures price, FUn'T +At), the endogenous
spot price, S(tn)' and transaction costs, TC(tn)' These quantities are uncertain
since the arbitrageur, like speculators, suffers an execution lag. The result of
DAUn) arbitrage positions discounted to the execution date tn is denoted as the
arbitrage profit. GUn)' ofthis position. Its precise definition iS l6
n=l,...,N.
Using the definition ofthe implied spot price. equation (14) can be rewritten as
(15) G(tn) = DA(tn){S/Un)-SUn)} - TCUn)'
15
16
The notation should be understood as follows: The spot price is considered as a variable
as long as no equilibrium conditions are imposed. The stochastic process of the
equilibrium spot price will be discussed in section 2.3. This distinction in not necessary
for the exogenous implied spot price.
Note that G(T+ ~t) is zero, independent ofthe trading strategy.
11Thus, the profit of the arbitrageur is detennined by the mispricing of the spot
instrument, MIS(tn) == S/(tn)-S(tn)' and the transaction costs. The implied spot
price, S/(tn), is detennined by the exogenous futures price and does not depend on
the trades of positive feedback traders, infonnation traders, noise traders, or
arbitrageurs. Contrary, the second tenn, S(tn), is influenced by the demands ofthe
feedback traders, infonnation traders, and noise traders. In addition, the demand
ofthe monopolistic arbitrageur has an impact on S(tn) which the arbitrageur takes
into account when he decides on the number of his arbitrage transactions. This
price impact is characterized by a yet unknown positive constant factor a A which
is related to the liquidity ofthe spot market. This factor, a A' will be characterized
in equation (29) below. Therefore, the spot price, S(tn) , can be decomposed into a
spot price without arbitrage trading, SNA (tn)' and the impact of arbitrage trading,
that is
The total transaction costs, TC(tn), in equation (14) are assumed to be
proportional to the trading volume of the arbitrageur, DA(tn), and the endogenous
spotprice, S(tn)' Thus, total transaction costs are
where Tca are the transaction costs perunit. Due to asymmetric transaction costs
at opening and unwinding, the value Tca is detennined through the current
demand, DA(til)' of the arbitrageur and his fonner trades. Ifhe is long in the spot
instrument and short in the future (long arbitrage position) and wants to open
another long arbitrage position, DA(tn) > 0, he has to pay opening round-trip unit
costs, Co'Ifhe wants to go short, DA(tn)<O, it is assumed that he first unwinds the
long positions held at the lower unwinding unit costs, Cuw' Analogously, if he
wants to switch from a net long position to a net short position, he fIrst unwinds
all existing positions at unit costs cuw and then opens new short positions at costs
Co' This assumption implies that Tca depends on the current arbitrage demand,
DA(tn)' and the net arbitrage position, B(tn_l)' which equals the sum of fonner
demands:17
17 Note that this assumption restricts the trading strategy of the arbitrageur. In some
situations he may be better off by holding simultaneously long and short arbitrage
positions. This property of the arbitrageur's optimal strategy is in variance with the
Brennan/Schwartz (1990) and Cooper/Mello (1990) models where it is always optimal to
unwind a long (short) position before a short (long) position is opened. The main reason







The unwinding costs per unit, Cuw' apply as long as IDA (tn )\ ::;IB(tn-I)I, and the signs




IDA(tn)l::; \B(II1_ I )I,B(111_ 1)*DA(til)< 0
Using this defInition of the transaction costs per unit, the total transaction costs
will be
The monopolistic arbitrageur is assumed to maximize the present value of his
expected total arbitrage profIt in the period of time [0,T].18 That profIt, P uw' is
defmed as
where Eodenotes the expectation with respect to the information available at time
t=O about the stochastic process [F(O,T+At),... ,F(tN,T+~t)]of the exogenous
variable F(tll,T +~t).19 The optimization problem can be solved using a dynamic
programming approach where the state variable at tn_l is characterized by the price
history, FH(t"_I)=[F(O,T+~t), ... ,F(t"_"T+~t)], of the futures price. Conditional on
this price history, the expected one period profit as a function ofthe arbitrageur's
market order, DA(til)' will be
18
19
Theoretically, it is easy to relax this assumption, but it makes the computation much
harder as the number of state variables in order to determine the optimal strategy ofthe
arbitrageur would increase from three to four. This will become clear later.
Note that at time T +At the futures contract is settled and no arbitrage profits or losses
occur. Therefore, that point oftime can be neglected.
{F(tll,T+~t)} is defmed on the a-algebra of N+l-dimensional Borel sets equipped
with the Lebesgue measure.
13E"_I[G(t,,)IF H (t,,-I)]=DA(t,,)*{E"_I[Sf (t")IF H (t,,-I)]- E,,_I [SNA (t,,)IFH (t,,_I)] - CiADA(t,,)}
(22)
-IDA(t,,)* {E"_I[SNA (t,,)IFH(t,,-I)]+CiADA(t,,)}* TCU [FH(t,,-I ),DA(t,,)]1·
The first term in equation (22) is the expected profit without transaction costs,
and the second one characterizes the conditional expected transaction costs. The
expected profit of the arbitrageur at any time t" depends on the whole history of
the futures price, FH(t,,_l). Therefore, the price path of the future determines the
expected implied spot price, the expected spot price, the stock of open arbitrage
positions, and the transaction costs per unit. So, the expected profit and,
therefore, the behavior ofthe arbitrageur are path depend~nt.
The price history, FH(t"-l)' matters only as far as it influences the endogenous spot
price, S(tIl_I)' the futures price, F(t,,_I'T+ ~t), and the net arbitrage position, B(tIl_I).
Therefore, a reduction (if n-l>3) of the dimension of the state variable FH(tll_ l )
from n-l to these three state variables is possible. With this parsimonious
modelling ofthe state variable, the conditional expected one period profit may be
reformulated as
Ell_I [G(tll)IF(t,,_I),S(tll_ 1),B(tIl_I)] =
(23) DA(tll)*{E"_I[Sf (til )IF(t,,-I)]- Ell_I [SNA (t,,)IF(tIl_I)' S(t,,_I)]- CiADA(t,,)}
-IDA(t,,)*{E"_l[SNA (t1l)IF(tIl_l),S(t,,_l)]+CiADA(t,,)} * TCU[B(t,,_I),DA(t,,)]I,
where tN- 1 is the last point oftime at which the arbitrageur determines his optimal
demand D~(tN). This demand is executed at time tN. Positions not unwound until
time tN' B(tN), are closed at the maturity date T+M ofthe futures contract.
It can be shown that a unique solution strategy D~(tll)' n=l,...,N, of the
optimization problem (21)exists. The proofuses the fact that, without transaction
costs, the objective function is quadratic and strictly convex in DA(t,,), n = 1,...,N.
The behavior of the arbitrageur in this model is quite different from a cash and
carry arbitrageur. The arbitrageur considered here has to take into account the
impact of his trading on future arbitrage opportunities when deciding about his
current optimal market order, D~(til). This link is established through the impact
ofhis decision on the equilibrium spot price, S(tll)' and the resulting net arbitrage
position, B(t,,).
Finally, it should be noted that the arbitrageur differs in three important respects
from the other market participants. One difference is that he is the only one who
14trades in the futures and in the spot market. Another difference is that he places
market orders in order to avoid unbalanced positions in the futures and the spot
instrument. The third difference is that the arbitrageur is fully rational in the sense
that he uses the equilibrium model of the spot market to determine the expected
spot price at time tn'
(IV) Demand ofnoise traders
The last group of investors considered in the model are noise traders. Their
motivation to buy or sell the spot instrument is not modelled explicitely. It is
assumed that their demand does neither depend on the spot price nor on the
futures price. The demand of an individual noise trader, De..(tn)' at time tn is
uncegain. Itis described by the following stochastic process:
Ze..(tn) is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and variance
cr~M. Ze..(t) and Ze..(tk) are assumed to be uncorrelated whenever ti*tk (i,k =
1,...,N). In addition, Ze..(tn) (n = 1,...,N) are uncorrelated with the exogenous
random variable Z(tJ (i = 1,...,N).
2.3. Equilibrium
Inthis section the equilibrium process ofthe spot price conditioned onthe futures
price is determined. The price ofthe spot instrument, S(O), at the beginning ofthe
trading period is given exogenously. Trading takes place N times during the
interval [6t,T] at the points of time tn (n=I,...,N). At the same points of time,
market clearing is achjeved through N Walrasian auctions. Therefore, the
equilibrium concept is an auction equilibrium where the traders differ by their
motives for trading and by the price forecasting models which they use. The
equilbrium is defmed as an allocation of optimal demands,
DF[tn.AS(tn)]. D/[t".AS,(tn).AS(tn)].DN(t,,).D;(tn)' and a sequence of random prices,
S(tn), for n =1,...,N such that the spot market clears.20 Under the assumption that
there are h identical positive feedback traders, y/ identical information traders,
YN identical noise traders, and a monopolistic arbitrageur, the following market
clearing condition has to be satisfied:
20 The random character ofthe equilibirum spot price is now considered in the notation.
15This equation has to hold at each tn (n=1,...,N ) conditioned on the spot price
S(tn_l), the implied spot price Sf (tn-I)' and the number of open arbitrage positions
B(tn_I)·
In section 2.2., the optimal demand of positive feedback traders, DF[tn,AS(tn)],
and the optimal demand of information traders, Df[tn,ASf(tJ,~(tJ], were derived
as functions of the market clearing price. Furthermore, it was argued that an
optimal strategy for the arbitrageur exists which takes into account the impact of
the arbitrageur's trading on expected profits in later auctions. The arbitrageur
submits optimal market orders given the information available at time tn_I.
Inserting these demand function into the left hand side of the market clearing
condition (25) yields the aggregate conditional demand function:
The aggregate demand function is linear in the equilibrium price, S(tn)' and has a
constant slope of-lJa where a is given by
(27) a
The slope is assumed to be negative, so that the paramter, a, which can be
interpreted as the market liquidity parameter is positive. Using this parameter, the
market clearing condition yields the equilibrium spot price conditional on
S(tll_I),Sf(t_I)' and B(t_I):
There are four main properties of this equilibriurp. process. One is that the spot
price rises with an increase in the implied spot price, S/(tn), as the demand of
information traders increases.21 It also rises22 with an increase in arbitrage
demand, D~(tn). The spot price decreases with an increase ofthe reference price,
SF(tn), of the positive feedback traders. Second, the conditional volatility of the
spot price depends on the volatility ofthe implied spot price and on the basis risk
introduced by the demand of noise traders. Third, without noise traders, the
21 This monotonicity property should be understood in the following sense. Whenever the
realization S/(tn ) is larger than S/(tll ), then the same relation holds between the
corresponding spotprices.
22 In the sense ofstochastic dominance offirst order.
16conditional volatility ratio between the futures and the spot market is mainly
determined by the slope ofthe demand functions ofpositive feedback traders and
infonnation traders as well as by the size of these groups. An increasing number
of feedback traders raises the volatility of the spot price while an increasing
number ofinformation traders reduces the volatility ofthe spot price. The demand
of noise traders has a straightforward influence on the volatility of S(t,.). Finally,
the endogenous spot price, SU,.) , is not Markovian as it depends via the demand
ofthe arbitrageur, D:U,.), on the whole price history.
The undefined parameter, aA , in the optimization problem of the arbitrageur can
now be specified. From equation (28), a A is shown to be
(29) a A =a,
and the conditional expected spot price at time t,. is
To discuss the role of the arbitrageur in the model, the endogenous spot price
process is transfonned into a process for mispricing, MIS(t,.) E S/(tn)-S(tn). It
follows from equation (28) that the change ofthe mispricing MfISUn) is
Without arbitrage trading, Le. DA(tn ) EO, and without noise trading, the first term
is positive and non-stochastic. It raises a positive mispricing and reduces a
negative one. The expected change ofthe implied spot price is positive and has,
therefore, an opposite effect. So, contrary to the model of Cooper and Mello
(1990), the basis does not even on average necessarily converge to its cash and
carry value if the arbitrageur does not trade. Since noise traders have no
systematic influence on"the basis, it is the role of the arbitrageurs to assure a
comovement ofspot and futures market.
173. Value ofthe Early Unwind Option
To defme the value of the early unwind option, two arbitrageurs are considered.
The fIrst one has the opportunity to unwind arbitrage positions and faces the
optimization problem described in equation (21) with the optimal expected
present value ofthe total arbitrage profit, Puw•The second arbitrageur differs from
the fIrst one only by his restricted set of strategies. The second arbitrageur has to
hold every arbitrage position until maturity date, T + /).t, of the future where it is
settled against his spot position. Like the fIrst arbitrageur, he is a monopolist with
rational expectations, and his optimal expected present value ofthe total arbitrage
profIt is denoted by Po. The value of the early unwind option, Vuw, is defined as
the difference
(32) Vuw =Puw -Po
between these optimal present values. As all arbitrage positions are settled at
maturity T+M, the non-negative value ofthe early unwind option is the result of
different transaction costs for opening and closing transactions.23 If the closing
transaction cost rate, cuw' equals the opening cost rate, Co' the unwind option is
worthless.
'According to equations (21), (23), and (30), the expected present value of all
arbitrage opportunities depends mainly on the following factors. First, the
expected total arbitrage profit depends on the current spot price S(O) and on the
current futures price F(O,T+M) or, equivalently, on the current implied spot price
S/(0). Next, the distribution of futures prices FUn'T +M) or implied spot prices
s/(t
ll
) (n ~ 1,...,N), especially the volatility, cr, in the stochastic process of the
futures price, has an impact on the expected profit. The same is true for the
volatility crL of the noise trader's demand. The market liquidity parameter, a,
captures the influence of arbitrage trading on the spot price and therefore the
expected total profit. The interest rate r determines the discount factor and the
slopes of the demand functions. Given the length of the execution lag, /).t, the
time to maturity, T+M, of the future determines 'the number oftrading dates and
therefore the expected total profit. Finally, transaction costs of opening an
arbitrage position, Co' have an impact on the expected total profit. In addition, if
early unwinding is possible, the number, B(O), of open arbitrage positions at the
beginning and transaction costs, cuw' for closing an arbitrage position are relevant.
23 Another argument for the unwind option to have a positive value is that arbitrageurs may
have a position limit. This is pointed out by Brennan/Schwartz (1988, 1990).
18The influence ofthese factors on Puw and Po is easy to analyze in most cases. For
example, both expected present values increase ifthe current absolute mispricing
and time to maturity increase. They decrease with the market liquidity parameter
and with transaction costs. In addition, Puw increases with the absolute number of
open arbitrage positions as the arbitrageur has more chances to unwind positions
at lower costs. However, the influence of these factors on the difference Puw - Po
and, therefore, on the option value is not obvious in most cases.
There are two basic effects which determine the value ofthe early unwind option.
One effect occurs when an arbitrageur has an open arbitrage position and there is
a favourable mispricing, e.g. an open long position and a negative mispricing. If
this is the case the arbitrageur can obtain an immediate additional profit by
unwinding the position at the lower transaction cost rate, Cuw' This effect relates
to the_intrinsic value of an option. The second effect is that, even if the
arbitrageur has currently no open arbitrage position, with every opening
transaction he aquires the chance to save transaction costs in the future. This
second effect is an indirect one as it does not lead immediately to transaction
costs savings compared with a hold to maturity strategy. It is related to the time
value ofan option.
Standard options are said to be in-the-money when the immediate exercise of the
option yields a profit, the well-defmed intrinsic value ofthe option. Applying this
criterion to the early unwind option is difficult for three reasons. First, whenever
the arbitrageur decides to unwind a position he does not know the profit resulting
from this decision as there is an execution lag. Second, when the arbitrageur
decides to unwind, the profit depends on the mispricing of the spot instroment
and on transaction costs which he influences through his decision. Third, by
trading, the arbitrageur also changes his net number ofarbitrage positions and, by
that, the value ofthe unwind option he holds. Therefore, the term "in-the-money"
will not be used in the usual sense. Rather, the unwind option is said to be in-the-
money whenever there is positive (negative) mispricing and a negative (positive)
number ofopen arbitrage positions. Thus, the term just indicates whether, given a
certain net arbitrage posi~on, the sign of the mispricing is favourable to the
arbitrageur. According to this defmition, the option is at-the-money when there is
no mispricing and out-of-the-money when the mispricing and the number of
arbitrage positions show the same sign.
194. Numerical Results
4.1. Parameter Values
The parameter values of the stochastic price processes introduced in section 2.2
are estimated using price quotations for the German stock index DAX and the
corresponding futures contracts. The fonnulation of the stochastic processes
demands a specification of the volatilities in absolute terms (index points). The
percentage numbers are based onan index value of2,000. Using daily transaction
prices the following estimated values are obtained:
Drift ofthe DAX
Factorofadaptionfor the spot price
Volatility ofthe disturbance term
Factorofadaptionfor the mispricing
Volatility ofthe disturbance term







Forthe remaining parameters the following basic constellation is assumed:















: YF = Y/ = YL = 15000
From these parameter the slopes ofthe demand functions and the market liquidity
parameterare computed as:






The market liquidity parameter implies that one unit arbitrage demand raises the
spot price by 1.15 indexpoints.
204.2. Comparative Static Analysis
The relationship between the option value and the state variables spot price,
implied spot price, and the number of arbitrage positions is complex as there are
several effects influencing this value. Figures 1 and 2 present the option value as
a function ofthe current spot price, S(O), for a given implied spot price S/(O) and
three different net arbitrage positions, B(O). The spot price varies between 1800
and 2200, and this corresponds to the mispricing interval, S/(O)-S(O), ranging
from +200 to -200 index points.
Figure 1: Value of the Early Unwind Option as a Function of the Current Spot Price:
Number ofOpen Arbitrage Positions B(O) = 0
Implied Spot Price =2000
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For the discussion of figure 1 the reader is reminded that the value of the early
unwind option is defined as the difference of the expected present value oftotal
arbitrage profits with and without early unwinding possibility.
Ifthe arbitrageur holds no open position, and ifthe current spot price equals its
implied value, the early unwind option has a positive value. This is true since at
future points oftime it may be advantageous to open an arbitrage position and to
unwind it at a later date.24 Ifthe absolute value of the mispricing increases, the
24 Therefore, in a situation where at fIrst early unwinding is not allowed and where then this
regulation is lifted, the arbitrageur receives a valuable option free even if he holds no
open positions and the mispricing is zero. Since the value of this option comes from the
different transaction costs at opening and closing positions, this free option is given to
the arbitrageur by the broker and the exchange on which the spot instrument is traded.
They loose transaction costs when positions are closed compared with the case that a
new position ofthe same size is opened.
21value of the option fIrst increases and then decreases. This behavior can be
explained by the fact that, given the number of open positions, the value of the
option depends on the probability that this option will be in-the-money at a future
point of time. For the option to be in-the-money in the future when the current
number ofopen positions is zero, two conditions have to be met. The first is that
there has-to be a mispricing.such that the arbitrageur opens an arbitrage position.
At that time the option becomes alive and is out-of-the-money. The second
condition is that the sign ofthe mispricing has to change so that the option will be
in-the-money. Thus, the early unwind option is path dependent and somewhat
similar to a drop-in-option. Ifthe absolute mispricing is large, the arbitrageur will
open a large number ofarbitrage positions, but the probability that the sign of the
mispricing changes and this position can be unwound early will be small.
However, ifthe absolute mispricing is small the arbitrageur will only open a few
arbitrage positions, but it is very likely that the sign ofthe mispricing will change
and permit the arbitrageur to close the position early. It can be seen in figure I
that, for the parameters chosen, the two opposite effects lead to a maximum at an
absolute mispricing ofabout 40 index points.
A completely different fIgure is obtained when analyzing an arbitrageur who
already holds a non-zero number ofopen arbitrage positions.
-Figure'2: Value ofthe Early Unwind Option as a Function ofthe Current Spot Price
Number ofOpen Arbitrage Positions B(O) =+20 and B(O) =-20




























Case 1, B(O)=+20: Ifthe arbitrageur is long in the spot instrument and short in
futures, the value of the option monotonically increases with the current spot
price or, equivalently, decreases with the mispricing. The maximum value of the
early unwind option at a spot price of 2,200 can be explained by the expected
savings of transaction costs at the next trading date. These savings can be
approximated py assuming that the arbitrageur has no execution risk. Immediate
22unwinding results in savings of the amount (co - cuw )*S(O)*B(O) = 165 which
approximates the exact value of 163.38 very closely. For negative values of the
mispricing, the option is in-the-money as the long position can be closed out with
an expected positive, profit. For positive values ofthe mispricing, the value ofthe
option is still higher than without open positions, but it converges to the value in
figure 1 if the option is deep out-of-the-money. This is due to the fact that the
probability ofunwinding these 20 open positions in the future converges to zero.
Case 2, B(O) =-20: Surprisingly, given open short positions and a certain
mispricing MIS (0), the option value does not equal the option value of the same
number oflong positions at the mispricing - MIS(0). For example, figure 2 shows
that the maximum option value for the short position is lower than the
corresponding value ofthe long position, and that the value ofthe option starts to
decline for large positive values of the mispricing. If, again, the execution risk of
the arbitrageur is neglected, the expected savings (co -cuw)*EO[S(tl)J*!D;(O)1 from
unwinding ID:(O)I positions can be approximated by (co-cuw)*S(O)*\D:(O)I.lfthe
msipricing increases from 0 to 200 index points, !D: (0)1 increases until all open
positions are unwound. This will be the case for a mispricing of 80 index points
or, equivalently, S(O) = 1920. Unwinding 20 position will result in transaction cost
savings of approximately 0.00375*1920*20=144 index points. If mispricing
increases further, the optimal demand of the arbitrageur will increase, too. As
only 20 units can be unwound early, the approximate savings in transaction costs
0.00375*S(0)*20 decreases with the spot price. By the same argument, in case 1
the value ofthe early unwind option increases in S(O) evenif D:(0) >B(O).
It was argued above that the value of the option depends on the number of net
arbitrage positions and the mispricing. In order to separate these two effects,
figure 3 demonstrates that, given a mispricing of zero, the value of the early
unwind option depends onthe number ofarbitrage positions.
23Figure 3: Value of the Early Unwind Option as a Function of the Current Number of
Open Positions: No Current Mispricing
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It can be seen that the option value is minimal when the arbitrageur has no open
positions. Without any open arbitrage position, the arbitrageur has no opportunity
to earn an immediate unwind profit. He first has to open a new position before he
gets a chance to unwind it. The value of the option in the case B(O)=0 is 2 index
points or0.1 % ofthe index value.
The option value increases monotonically with the absolute number of arbitrage
positions. The more positions the arbitrageur holds, the more he can unwind ifin
the future the option will be in-the-money which subsequently increases the
expected savings in transaction costs and the option value as well. The marginal
option value ofone additional arbitrage position decreases resulting from the fact
that the spot price is endogenous. Unwinding a single arbitrage position at time tn
reduces the expected absolute value of the mispricing and therefore the expected
profit Qf unwinding an additional position. Furthermore, the probability of
unwinding another open position at the next point oftime, 1
11+1, declines. Contrary
to standard option pricing models, exercising the option influences the stochastic
process ofthe underlying asset.
Figure 3 is not symmetric. The option value for a positive number of open
positions is slightly larger than for the same number of negative open positions.
The reason for this asymmetry is that a long arbitrage position will be unwound if
the spot price increases relative to the implied spot price, a short arbitrage
position will be unwoundifthe opposite is true. Therefore, on average, savings of
transaction costs will be largerfor long positions than for short ones.
24When discussing figure 2, it was argued that the spot price has an impact on the
option value even ifthe mispricing and the net number of arbitrage positions are
given. The impact of the spot price is now discussed in more detail. Figure 4
shows the value of the early unwind option as a function of the spot price, 5(0).
This figure differs from figures I and 2 by the assumption that there is no current
mispricing, Le. 5(0)=51 (0) .
Figure 4: Value ofthe Early Unwind Option as a Function ofthe SpotPrice:
No Current Mispricing
Implied Spot Price =Spot Price
50,--------,---------,--------,--------,
















In correspondence with figure 3, the option value is lowest when the arbitrageur
has no open arbitrage position. Specifically, figure 4 shows that the option value
increases with the spot price if the arbitrageur holds a non zero position. If he
holds no position the value of the option decreases slightly with the spot price.
Other things being equal, unwinding current arbitrage positions will occur at
higher future spot prices ifthe current spot price is high.25 Since the transaction
cost savings are proportional to transaction costs the savings increase with the
future spot price and, therefore, with the current spot price, 5(0), as well. For that
reason, a higher current spqt price leads to a higher option value. This argument
does not hold when the arbitrageur has no open position. In that case, a second
effect dominates. As transaction costs increase with the spot price even if
transaction costs per unit are fIxed, other things being equal, higher transaction
costs reduce the trading volume. Without any open positions the arbitrageur fIrst
has to open some positions before the option becomes alive. Higher future spot
prices, therefore, result in less trading, in a lower number offuture open arbitrage
positions, and in less transaction cost savings. This effect dominates when the
arbitrageur currently holds no open position. Thus, the option value will not only
be determined by the mispricing and the number ofopen positions, but also by the
25 Again, future spot prices are compared by stochastic dominance offIrst order.
25spot price itself. Whether the option value increases or decreases with the current
spot price, depends on the number ofopen positions and the size ofmispricing.
From standard'option pricing theory, it is wellknown that the price of an american
type option increases with time to maturity. The early unwind option is an
american option as the arbitrageur may exercise it at every trading date. Thus, it
can be expected that its value increases with time to maturity. This hypothesis is
supported by figure 5 which shows the value of an at-the-money option for
different net arbitrage positions as a function of time to maturity of the futures
contract.
Figure 5: Value of the Early Unwind Option as a Function of Time to Maturity:
No Current Mispricing


































The option is worthless at time tN_1 when there are only 2 days left until the
futures contract is settled. This results from the fact that it does not pay for the
arbitrageur to place a closing order at tN-l as the actual rnispricing is assumed to
be zero and the closing order executed at time tN =T has an adverse price effect.
Instead, he will hold the position until T +& where the future is settled against the
spot position.
Without any open arbitrage position, the arbitrageur will not even trade when
there are a few days left. The reason is that he first has to open an arbitrage
position resulting in transaction costs and an adverse price effect. If the
rnispricing is zero at time tN- 2, this leads to an average arbitrage loss at tN_1 which
the arbitrageur only can be compensated for if the rnispricing at tN changes so
much that the expected future unwinding profits are very high. However, given
the parameters of the model, especially the volatility, this does not happen, and
that implies that the expected profit of this strategy is negative, that the
arbitrageur will not trade, and that the option is worthless. With a highervolatility
26of the exogenous random variables the option might have had a positive value
three days before maturity.
To discuss the effect of the volatility of the exogenous variable on the option
value, figure 6 shows the option value for three different volatilities ofthe implied
spot price.
Figure 6: Value ofthe Early Unwind Option as a Function ofthe Spot Price:
Different Volatilities ofthe Implied Spot Price
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The figure suggests that the option value does not necessarily increase as the
volatility ofthe implied spot price increases. Ifthe early unwind option is in-the-
money, an increase of cr results in a decrease of the option value, ifthe option is
out-of-the-money, the opposite effect results. These ambiguous consequences can
be explained by the fact that a variation of cr affects the drift and the conditional
volatility of the mispricing process (31) simultaneously as the parameter a
depends on cr. If cr increases, by equation (13), the absolute value of the slope,
cr./' of the demand function of information traders decreases. Since a decreases
with ai' as long as the denominator of a in equation (27) is positive, a increases,
and the market liquidity l/d. decreases with cr. Therefore, the conditional volatiliy
of the mispricing and the impact of arbitrage trading on the mispricing increases
with cr. Whereas the first effect results in higher option value, the second one
reduces the value ofthe early unwind option.
Before figure 6 will be discussed in detail, it will be shown that the volatility
effect can be seperated from the market liquidity effect. From equation (31)
follows that a reduction ofthe group size YF'YI,h under the restriction YF =YI == h
increases a, but does not change the coefficients of !!.SF' ZL' and MI' Therefore,
the conditional volatility of the mispricing process remains unchanged whereas
27the market impact of arbitrage trading increases. As a consequence, the option
value will decrease since unwinding the same numer of open positions will cause
larger adverse price movements. This effect is shown in figure 7.
Figure 7: Value ofthe Early Unwind Option as a Function ofthe Spot Price:
Different Market Liquidity
Implied Spot Price =2000
20 Open Long Positions
-.-yJ= yJ = y_N = 2000J
--YJ=yJ=y-N= lOOXJ
2200 2100 2000 1900
200 ,-------.----,------,---------,
180+-----+----f-----+------l
o V 1(fJ . .r+rlT~~X+l
p 140 ..ow-
t a 120 gr
I I 1~ ,:,~
o U (fJ 1~.~1i
n e 40 +--__-+-__ ~;/-.1I"'--__I---__l
20 --=-..o~+----+------i oEm.w ....... .n::@OO fI:~~
1800
Spot Price S(O)
The option values in figure 7 differ most if the option is in-the-money, but not
deep in-the-money. This can be justified by the argument that the arbitrageur is
able to unwind immediately less positions with a profit ifhis order has a larger
impact on the spot price. Ifthe option is deep in-the-money, he will unwind all
positions, evenifthe market liquidity is low. Therefore, the disadvantage oflower
market liquidity is smaller. If the option is out-of-the-money, the arbitrageur
makes no immediate unwinding profit.
The influence of cr on the market liquidity explains why in figure 6 the option
value for in-the-money options increases with decreasing volatility. However,
figure 6 also shows that for options out-of-the-money and deep in-the-money the
ranking of the curves changes. TIris results from the second effect of an
increasing volatiliy. If the option is out-of-the-money, i.e. 5(0) <51(0), its value
depends essentially on the probability that the mispricing changes its sign. Ifthe
volatility ofthe implied spot price increases, it follows from equation (31) that the
conditional volatility ofthe mispricing, the chance ofthe out-of-the-money option
to move in-the-money, and, therefore, the value ofthe option increases.
Ifthe option is deep in-the-money all positions will be unwound and a net short
position will be build up. Related with this new short position is a deep out-of-
the-money option since the spot price is considerably larger than the implied spot
price. As argued above, the value of this option increases with cr. This effect
dominates the market liquidity effectifthe absolute mispricing is high.
28Thus, the impact of the volatility on the option value is different for in- and out-
of-the-money-options and can be summarized as follows. If the option is out-of-
the-money the option value increases with volatility as there is a better chance for
the option to move in-the-money. If the option is in-the-money there are two
opposite effects. First, the lower the volatility, the lower will be the impact of the
unwinding on the mispricing, and the more positions the arbitrageur can unwind
immediately. The consequence of this higher market liquidity is smaller when the
mispricing is so large that all positions will be unwound evenifthe market is less
liquid. Second, the smaller the volatility, the smaller is the value of the deep out-
of-the-money option the arbitrageur receives when he opens new long or short
positions. This second effect dominates in the case of deep out-of-the-money
options.
Different transaction costs for opening and closing arbitrage positions are the
basic -reason for the positive value of the option. Therefore, the size of these
transaction costs should have a strong impact on the option value. To analyze this
impact, three questions will be addressed. How does the value of the early
unwind option changes when (1) the round trip transaction costs per unit Co are
fIxed and the difference to the unwinding transaction costs per unit Cuw increase,
(2) Co increases and the difference Co -cuw =0.00375 remains unchanged, and (3)
Co increases and the ratio co/cuw = 4 remains fIxed?
The fIrst and second questions can be answered qualitatively. Neglecting the
influence ofthe unwind option on the demand strategy, the immediate unwinding
profIt is determined by ID: (0)1*(co -Cuw )*S(tl)' If the unwinding costs, cuw'
decrease, the unwinding profIt and the option value will increase. The answer to
the second question follows from the observation that higher transaction costs
lead to less arbitrage trading, so ID: (0)\ decreases. If the difference (co - cuw ) is
constant, less trading leads to less immediate unwind profIt and, therefore, to a
lower option value. Both qualitative arguments have been supported by numerical
results.
The answer to the third question is not obvious as both effects described above
occur simultaneously. An increase in the round trip costs per unit reduces the
trading volume, but increases the transaction costs difference, (co - cuw), as the
unwind costs are proportional to the round trip costs. Figure 8 shows the value of
the early unwind option as a function of the current spot price for three different
round trip transaction costs per unit. The unwinding costs per unit are one quarter
ofthe round trip costs.
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Figure 8 demonstrates that the effect of increasing transaction costs differences
dominates the trade volume effect. So, assuming that the unwinding transaction
costs per unit are proportional to the round trip costs per unit, higher transaction
costs lead to a higher option value. Numerically, changing transaction costs per
.unit have the most important impact on the option value. This result could be
expected because the basic reason for a positive option value is the difference in
transaction costs perunit.
5. Conclusions
In this paper the value of the unwind option implied in open arbitrage positions
has been detennined where the underlying of the option has been assumed to be
an endogenous variable. The stochastic process of this variable emerges from a
dynamic market microstructure model. This model is mainly characterized by four
specific features. First, there are two different groups of speculative investors,
noise traders, and one monopolistic arbitrageur. The investors differ by their
motives for trading, by the price forecast model they use, by the type of orders
they place, and by the instruments they trade. Second, the futures market has an
impact on the spotmarket by arbitrage trading as well as by trading ofspeculative
investors who use the futures price as an infonnation in their trading decision.
Third, arbitrageurs are subject to an order execution lag which prevents risk free
arbitrage. Finally, as the stochastic processes of the spot price and the basis are
determined endogenously by the demands of the all investors, the basis depends
on the early unwind option ofthe arbitrageuritself.
30With respect to the endogenous basis process, the most important result of the
paper is that this process is not Markovian. The reason for the path dependency
lies in the structure of the arbitrageur's demand which depends on his whole
trading history. Concerning the value of the early unwind option, it is shown
numerically that the early unwind option has a positive value even if the
arbitrageur holds no open arbitrage position currently. A positive or negative
number of open arbitrage positions makes the option more valuable. The option
value is not symmetric with respect to the mispricing as the transaction costs
depend on the level of the spot price, and the option value does not change
monotonically with the mispricing. These results are in contrast to the Brennan
and Schwartz (1990) model where the underlying of the option is an exogenous
variable and transaction costs are constant. Contrary to standard option pricing
theory, an increase ofthe volatility ofthe exogenous variable does not necessarily
increase the option value. The reason for the ambiguous effect of changing
volatility is that both the market liquidity and the volatility of the mispricing
change simultaneously. Finally, although increasing transaction costs per unit
reduce the profit and the trading volume of the arbitrageur, the value of the early
unwind option increases. '
The results thus far suggest additional lines of research to be pursued in the
future. Four different spot price processes will be analyzed: the implied spot
price, the endogenous spot price without arbitrageur, the endogenous spot price
with an arbitrageur holding positions until maturity, and the endogenous spot
price with an arbitrageur who has the early unwind option. This investigation will
be supplemented by a comparative study of the arbitrageur's optimal demand
strategy. Special interest will be paid to his optimal unwind decision, especially to
the question how the critical values ofthe mispricing where the arbitrageur closes
out positions relate to the number of open arbitrage positions he holds. Finally, a
comparison of the endogenous basis with and without arbitrage will offer some
further insight into the role ofthe arbitrageur in the model.
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